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Abstract. The paper proposes a logical systematization of the notion of counts-
as which is grounded on a very simple intuition about what counts-as statements
actually mean, i.e., forms of classification. Moving from this analytical thesis the
paper disentangles three semantically different readings of statements of the type
X counts as Y in context C, from the weaker notion of contextual classification
to the stronger notion of constitutive rule. These many ways in which counts-as
can be said are then formally addressed by making use of modal logic techniques.
The resulting framework allows for a formal characterization of all the involved
notions and their reciprocal logical relationships.
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1 Introduction
The term “counts-as” derives from the paradigmatic formulation that in [1] and [2] is
attributed to the non-regulative component of institutions, i.e., constitutive rules:
[...] “institutions” are systems of constitutive rules. Every institutional fact is
underlain by a (system of) rule(s) of the form “X counts as Y in context C”
( [1], pp.51-52).
In legal theory the non-regulative component of normative systems has been labeled in
ways that emphasize a classificatory, as opposed to a normative or regulative, character:
conceptual rules ( [3]), qualification norms ( [4]), definitional norms ( [5]). Constitutive
rules are definitional in character:
The rules for checkmate or touchdown must ‘define’ checkmate in chess or
touchdown in American Football [...] ( [1], p.43).
With respect to this feature, a first reading of counts-as is thus readily available: it is
plain that counts-as statements express classifications. For example, they express what
is classified to be a checkmate in chess, or a touchdown in American Football. However,
is this all that is involved in the meaning of counts-as statements?
The interpretation of counts-as in merely classificatory terms does not do justice
to the notion which is stressed in the label “constitutive rule”, that is, the notion of
constitution. Aim of the paper is to show that this notion, as it is presented in some work
in legal and social theory, is amenable to formal characterization and that the theory we
Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 07122
Normative Multi-agent Systems
http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/913
developed in [6,7] provides a ground for its understanding. The paper disentangles and
analyzes three precise senses in which it can be said that “X counts as Y in context
C”. For each of these different senses of counts-as a formal semantics is developed by
making use of standard modal logic techniques. From a methodological point of view,
we will proceed as recommended here:
“[. . . ] it seems to me obvious that the only rational approach to such problems
would be the following: [1] We should reconcile ourselves with the fact that we
are confronted, not with one concept, but with several different concepts which
are denoted by one word; [2] we should try to make these concepts as clear as
possible (by means of definition, or of an axiomatic procedure, or in some other
way); [3] to avoid further confusions, we should agree to use different terms for
different concepts; and then we may proceed to a quiet and systematic study
of all concepts involved, which will exhibit their main properties and mutual
relations” ( [8], p. 355).
The structure of the paper reflects its method. Section 2 disentangles three different
meanings of counts-as statements and exposes a first informal analysis. In Section 3
a modal logic of contextual classification is introduced and by means of it a formal
analysis of the classificatory view of counts-as is provided. The two remaining senses of
counts-as are formally analyzed in Sections 5 and 6. Finally, the relationships between
the three readings are studied in Section 7. Conclusions follow in Section 8.
2 Counts-as between Classification and Constitution
Consider the following reasoning pattern.
Example 1. It is a rule of normative system Γ that conveyances transporting people or
goods count as vehicles; it is always the case that bikes count as conveyances trans-
porting people or goods but not that bikes count as vehicles; therefore, in the context of
normative system Γ , bikes count as vehicles.
This is an instance of a typical reasoning pattern involving constitutive rules. The
counts-as locution occurs three times. However, the second premise states a gener-
ally acknowledged classification (“bikes count as conveyances transporting people or
goods”), while the conclusion states classification which is considered to hold only
with respect to the normative system at issue (“according to normative system Γ , bikes
count as vehicles”). The first premise expresses something yet different, a classifica-
tion which is brought about —constituted— by the normative system: “conveyances
transporting people or goods are classified as vehicles” is one of the rules of Γ .
2.1 The classificatory reading of counts-as
The fact that “bikes count as conveyances transporting people or goods” can be readily
analyzed as a form of classification: the concept ‘bike’ is a subconcept of the concept
‘conveyance transporting people or goods’. ( [6, 9, 10]).
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In Example 1 one of the premises was that bikes do not always count as vehicles.
In other words, there are contexts in which ‘bike’ is not a subconcept of ‘vehicle’. This
suggests that a notion of context is necessary because classifications holding for a nor-
mative system are not of a universal kind, they do not hold in general. The classificatory
reading of counts-as statements of the form “X counts-as Y in context c” runs thus as
follows: “X is a subconcept of Y in context c”. Following much literature on context
theory (see for instance [11, 12]) we conceive of a context simply as set of situations
(possible worlds). What precisely these situations have to be in order to be considered
a context will be clarified soon discussing the notion of constitutive rule (Section 2.3).
Classificatory counts-as will be formally studied in Section 3. A more extensive dis-
cussion of the intuitions underpinning the classificatory reading of counts-as statements
can be found in [6, 7].
2.2 Counts-as statements as proper classifications
The analytic literature on constitutive norms often comes to emphasize the following
characteristic feature: counts-as statements are not just classifications but “new” clas-
sifications, that is, classifications which would not hold without the normative system
stating them:
“Where the rule is purely regulative, behaviour which is in accordance with the
rule could be given the same description or specification (the same answer to
the question “What did he do?”) whether or not the rule existed, provided the
description or specification makes no explicit reference to the rule. But where
the rule (or system of rules) is constitutive, behaviour which is in accordance
with the rule can receive specifications or descriptions which it could not re-
ceive if the rule did not exist” ( [1], p.35).
This was the case for the conclusion of the inference in Example 1: “in the context of
normative system Γ , bikes count as vehicles” although this is not generally the case.
In this view, counts-as statements do not only state contextual classifications, but they
state new classifications which would not otherwise hold.
Observation 1 Counts-as statements are classifications which hold with respect to a
context (set of situations) but which do not hold in general (i.e., with respect to all
situations).
We call counts-as statements intended in the sense of Observation 1 proper contextual
classifications. In other words, X counts as Y in context c because X is classified
as Y in c but also because this does not hold in general, i.e., in the global context.
They state that something new is brought about and in this sense the notion of proper
contextual classification already captures a precise notion of constitution: the fact that
X is classified as Y is constituted by context c in the sense that out of context c it might
not hold. Proper contextual classifications will be formally studied in Sections 4.1 5.
A more detailed exposition of the intuitions behind the proper classificatory view on
counts-as can be found in [7].
2.3 Counts-as statements as constitutive rules
Example 1 sketched an inference grounded on a constitutive rule: “It is a rule of norma-
tive system Γ that conveyances transporting people or goods count as vehicles”. First
of all, this statement expresses a classification which is brought about by the normative
system Γ (“conveyances transporting people or goods count as vehicles”), that is, what
we called in the previous section a proper contextual classification. There is however
something more. It explicitly states that a classification is one of the rules of Γ . This se-
mantic ingredient is not captured by the classificatory and proper classificatory readings
sketched in the previous sections and it involves two essential aspects.
The first one is that counts-as statements of the constitutive type are always part of
a set of similar statements, the system of rules Γ .
“Rules are constitutive if and only if they are part of a set of rules. Strictly
speaking, there is no such thing as a rule that is constitutive in isolation” ( [13],
p.5).
The second aspect concerns the relation between, on the one hand, the notion of a
set of rules Γ , i.e., normative system or institution, and on the other hand the notion of
set of situations c, or context c. A Γ constitutes a context c by means of its rules. The
set of classifications stated as constitutive rules by a normative system (for instance,
“conveyances transporting people or goods count as vehicles”) can be thought of as the
set of situations which make that set of classifications true. Hence, the set of constitutive
rules of any normative system can be seen as a set of situations. And a set of situations
—we have seen— is what is called a context in much literature on context theory (see
for instance [11, 12]). To put it in a nutshell, a context is a set of situations, and if
the constitutive rules of a given normative system Γ are satisfied by all and only the
situations in a given set, then that set of situations is the context defined by Γ . This
simple observation allows us to think of contexts as “systems of constitutive rules” ( [1],
p.51). Notice that this is no exotic thought. In fact, this idea has been neatly advanced
—informally— in some literature on the theory of institutions:
“A set of constitutive rules defines a logical space” ( [13], p.6).
A logical space is nothing but a set of states, i.e., a context. Getting back to Example
1, consider the statement concluding the argument: “according to Γ , bikes count as
vehicles”. In this light such a statement just says that “in the set of situations defined by
the rules of system Γ , bike is a subconcept of vehicle”.
The discussion above is distilled in the following observation.
Observation 2 A constitutive counts-as statement is a proper contextual classification
such that: (a) it is an element of the set of rules specifying a given normative system
Γ ; (b) the set of rules of Γ define the context (set of situations) to which the counts-as
statement pertains.
Constitutive counts-as statements will be formally studied in Sections 4.2 and 6.
To recapitulate, we distinguished between constitutive counts-as statements, proper
classificatory counts-as statements and classificatory counts-as statements. When state-
ments “X counts as Y in the context c of normative system Γ ” are read as constitutive
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rules, what is meant is that the classification of X under Y is considered to be an ex-
plicit promulgation of the normative system Γ defining context c. Instead, when they
are read as proper classificatory statements they are meant to denote classifications that
are constituted, or brought about, by the context at issue in the sense that they might not
hold if another context is considered. Finally, when they are read as mere contextual
classification, they are meant to denote classificatory statements that are just the case in
the given context .
3 Modal logic of Classificatory Counts-as
This section summarizes the results presented in [6]. We first introduce the languages
we are going to work with: propositional n-modal languages MLn ( [14]). The alpha-
bet of MLn contains: a countable set P of propositional atoms p; the set of boolean
connectives {¬,∧,∨,→}; a finite non-empty set of n (context) indexes C, and the op-
erator [ ]. Metavariables i, j, ... are used for denoting elements of C. The set of well
formed formulas φ of MLn is then defined by the following BNF:
φ ::= ⊥ | p | ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | φ1 ∨ φ2 | φ1 → φ2 | [i]φ.
We will refer to formulae φ in which at least one modal operator occurs as modalized
formulae. We call instead objective formulae in which no modal operator occur and we
denote them using the metavariables γ1, γ2, . . ..
3.1 Semantics
Semantics for these languages is given via structures M = 〈F , I〉, where:
– F is a CXT frame, i.e., a structure F = 〈W, {Wi}i∈C〉, where W is a finite set of
states (possible worlds) and {Wi}i∈C is a family of subsets of W .
– I is an evaluation function I : P −→ P(W ) associating to each atom the set of
states which make it true.
Such frames model thus n different contexts i which might be inconsistent, if the cor-
responding set Wi is empty, or global if Wi coincides with W itself. This implements
in a straightforward way the thesis developed in context modeling according to which
contexts can be soundly represented as sets of possible worlds ( [11]).
The satisfaction relation, then, results in the following.
Definition 1. (Satisfaction based on CXT frames)
Let M be a model built on a CXT frame.
M, w |= [i]φ iff ∀ w′ ∈Wi :M, w′  φ
M, w |= 〈i〉φ iff ∃w′ ∈Wi :M, w′  φ.
The obvious boolean clauses are omitted. Validity in a model, in a frame and in a class
of frames are defined as usual.
It is instructive to make a remark about the [i]-operator clause, which can be seen as
the characterizing feature of the modeling of contexts as sets of worlds1. It states that
the truth of a modalized formula abstracts from the point of evaluation of the formula.
In other words, the notion of “truth in a context i” is a global notion: [i]-formulae are
either true in every state in the model or in none. This reflects the idea that what is
true or false in a context does not depend on the world of evaluation, and this is what
we would intuitively expect especially for contexts interpreted as normative systems:
what holds in the context of a given normative system is not determined by the point of
evaluation but just by the system in itself, i.e., by its rules: the fact that in Γ bikes count
as vehicles depends only on the rules of Γ .
3.2 Axiomatics
The multi-modal logic that corresponds, i.e., that is sound and complete with respect
to the class of CXT frames, is a system we call here K45ijn . It consists of a logic
weaker than the logic KD45ijn investigated in [6] in that the semantic constraint has
been dropped which required the sets in family {Wi}i∈C to be non-empty. As a conse-
quence the D axiom is eliminated. To put it in a nutshell, the system is the very same
logic for contextual classification developed in [6] except for the fact the we want to al-
low here the representation of empty contexts as well. In the knowledge representation
setting we are working in, where contexts can be identified with the normative sys-
tems defining them, this amounts to accept the possibility of normative systems issuing
inconsistent constitutive rules.
Logic K45ijn is axiomatized via the following axioms and rules schemata:
(P) all tautologies of propositional calculus
(K) [i](φ1 → φ2)→ ([i]φ1 → [i]φ2)
(4ij) [i]φ→ [j][i]φ
(5ij) ¬[i]φ→ [j]¬[i]φ
(Dual) 〈i〉φ↔ ¬[i]¬φ
(MP) φ1, φ1 → φ2 / φ2
(N) φ / [i]φ
where i, j denote elements of the set of indexes C. The system is a multi-modal homo-
geneousK45with the two interaction axioms 4ij and 5ij . Soundness and completeness
are proven in Section 9.
A remark is in order especially with respect to axiomata 4ij and 5ij . In fact, what the
two schemata do, consists in making the nesting of the operators reducible which, leav-
ing technicalities aside, means that truth and falsehood in contexts ([i]φ and ¬[i]φ) are
somehow absolute because they remain invariant even if evaluated from another con-
text ([j][i]φ and [j]¬[i]φ). In other words, they express the fact that whether something
holds in a context i is not something that a context j can influence. This is indeed the
kind of property to be expected given the semantics presented in the previous section.
1 Propositional logics of context without this clause are investigated in [15, 16].
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3.3 Classificatory Counts-as formalized
Using a multi-modal logic K45ijn on a language MLn, the formal characterization of
the classificatory view on counts-as statements runs as follows.
Definition 2. (Classificatory counts-as: ⇒clc )
“γ1 counts as γ2 in context c” is formalized in a multi-modal language MLn as the
strict implication between two objective sentences γ1 and γ2 in logic K45ijn:
γ1 ⇒clc γ2 := [c](γ1 → γ2)
These properties for ⇒clc follow.
Proposition 1. (Properties of ⇒clc )
In logic K45ijn , the following formulas and rules are valid:
γ2 ↔ γ3 / (γ1 ⇒clc γ2)↔ (γ1 ⇒clc γ3) (1)
γ1 ↔ γ3 / (γ1 ⇒clc γ2)↔ (γ3 ⇒clc γ2) (2)
((γ1 ⇒clc γ2) ∧ (γ1 ⇒clc γ3))→ (γ1 ⇒clc (γ2 ∧ γ3)) (3)
((γ1 ⇒clc γ2) ∧ (γ3 ⇒clc γ2))→ ((γ1 ∨ γ3)⇒clc γ2) (4)
γ ⇒clc γ (5)
(γ1 ⇒clc γ2) ∧ (γ2 ⇒clc γ3)→ (γ1 ⇒clc γ3) (6)
(γ1 ⇒clc γ2) ∧ (γ2 ⇒clc γ1)→ [c](γ1 ↔ γ2) (7)
(γ1 ⇒clc γ2)→ (γ1 ∧ γ3 ⇒clc γ2) (8)
(γ1 ⇒clc γ2)→ (γ1 ⇒clc γ2 ∨ γ3) (9)
We omit the proofs, which are straightforward via application of Definition 2. This sys-
tem validates all the intuitive syntactic constraints isolated in [17] (validities 1-4). In
addition, this semantic-oriented approach to classificatory counts-as enables the four
validities 6-9. Besides, this analysis shows that counts-as conditionals, once they are
viewed as conditionals of a classificatory nature, naturally satisfy reflexivity (5), tran-
sitivity (6), and a form of “contextualized” antisymmetry (7), strengthening of the an-
tecedent (8) and weakening of the consequent (9).
4 Beyond Classificatory Counts-as
Aim of this section is to provide formal counterparts to Observations 1 and 2 which
can work as intermediate step towards the development of suitable modal logics for
the analysis of proper classificatory counts-as (Section 5) and constitutive counts-as
(Section 6).
4.1 From classification to proper classification
As usual, model-theoretic considerations can give us crucial hints. Let us define the set
T(X) of all formulae which, given a model, are satisfied by all worlds in a set of worlds
X:
T(X) = {φ | ∀w ∈ X :M, w |= φ}.
and let T→(X) be the set of all implications between objective formulae γ1 and γ2
which are satisfied by all worlds in a set of worlds X:
T
→(X) = {γ1 → γ2 | ∀w ∈ X :M, w |= γ1 → γ2}.
Obviously, for every X: T→(X) ⊆ T(X). In the classificatory reading, given a model
M where the set of worlds Wc ⊆ W models context c, the set of all classificatory
counts-as statements holding in c, which we denote as CL(Wc), can be defined as the
set T→(Wc):
CL(Wc) := T→(Wc).
Hence, it is easy to see that: T→(W ) ⊆ CL(Wc) ⊆ T(Wc). In other words, the set of
classificatory counts-as statements is:
– A subset of all the truths of Wc;
– A superset of all conditional truths of W , that is, of the “global” or “universal”
context of model M.
While the first point represents a quite banal semantic constraint to which any formal
characterization of counts-as should adhere, the second one is much more questionable.
Indeed, what is true anyway is not characteristic of any context (except of the global
one), and it cannot be properly said to represent any new truth. In other words, inter-
preting counts-as statements as mere classifications, as it has been done in Section 3
make them inherit all trivial classifications which hold globally in the model. This is
the reason why classificatory counts-as, as shown in Proposition 1, behaves classically
enjoying antecedent strengthening as well as transitivity and reflexivity.
These considerations suggest thus a readily available strategy to specify the set of
proper classificatory counts-as holding in a context c on the basis of T→(Wc). The
problem boils down to eliminate from the set of classificatory counts-asCL for a context
Wc those classifications which hold globally, that is, which hold with respect to the
global context W . We obtain, in this way, the set of proper classificatory counts-as
statements, or proper contextual classifications, holding in context c in a CXT model
M.
Definition 3. (Set of proper classificatory counts-as in c)
The set CL+(Wc) of proper classificatory counts-as statements of a context c in a CXT
model M is defined as follows:
CL
+(Wc) := T→(Wc) \ T(W ). (10)
Intuitively, the set of proper classificatory count-as holding in c corresponds to the set
of implications between objective formulae which hold in c, minus those implications
which hold universally. Or, to put it otherwise, the set of proper classificatory count-as
holding in c corresponds to the set of classificatory counts as of c, minus those implica-
tions which hold universally: CL+(Wc) := CL(Wc) \ T(W ). This is the most natural
amendment of the classificatory view toward the specification of a stronger notion of
contextual classification along the lines of Observation 1.
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4.2 From proper classification to constitution
Let us now focus on Observation 2. What comes to play a role is the notion of a defini-
tion of the context of a counts-as statement. A definition of a context c, in a CXT model
M, is a set of objective formulae2 Γ such that ∀w ∈W :
M, w |= Γ iff w ∈Wc (11)
that is, the set of formulae Γ such that all and only the worlds in Wc satisfy Γ in M.
Observation 2 can now get a formal formulation. Given the set of formulae Γ , we
say that any formula γ1 → γ2 ∈ Γ is a constitutive counts-as statement w.r.t. context c
iff Γ defines context c and γ1 → γ2 belongs to the set of proper contextual classifica-
tions of c.
Definition 4. (Set of constitutive counts-as in c w.r.t. definition Γ )
The set CO(Γ,Wc) of constitutive counts-as statements of a context c defined by Γ in a
CXT model M is:
CO(Γ,Wc) := {γ1 → γ2 ∈ Γ | γ1 → γ2 ∈ CL+(Wc)
and ∀w(M, w |= Γ iff w ∈Wc)} (12)
Notice that CO(Γ,Wc) is defined taking as domain the set of implicative statements of
Γ . Notice also that as a result of this definition if Γ does not define context Wc then
CO(Γ,Wc) = ∅. In fact, Formula 12 can be restated as follows:
CO(Γ,Wc) =
{
CL
+(Wc) ∩ Γ, if Γ defines Wc
∅, otherwise.
Section 6 is devoted to the development of a modal logic based on this definition.
The definitions discussed are summarized in the table below.
Cxt Classification CL(Wc) = T→(Wc)
Proper Cxt Classification CL+(Wc) = CL(Wc) \ T(W )
Constitution CO(Γ,Wc) =
{
CL
+(Wc) ∩ Γ, if Γ defines Wc
∅, otherwise.
The table pinpoints the dependencies between the formal characterizations of the three
different senses of counts-as which has been taken into consideration: the notion of
constitution builds on the notion of proper contextual classification which in its turn
builds on the notion of contextual classification. The modal logic analysis of contextual
classification developed in Section 3 can thus be used as a sound starting point for the
modal logic analysis of the two notions introduced in this section.
2 This is no arbitrary choice since it can be easily seen that contextual formulae, since they
denote global properties of the models, are as a matter of fact irrelevant for the definition of
sets of worldsWi such that ∅ ⊂ Wi ⊂ W , that is, those sets which denote neither the empty
nor the universal contexts. It is therefore natural to restrict definitions to objective formulae.
4.3 A methodological note
Before rendering the insights of Sections 4.1 and 4.2 in modal logic, it is worth making a
methodological remark. We are here concerned with a term, “counts-as”, which appears
to have different meanings. At this point we had two main ways to pursue the formal
characterization of counts-as we were aiming at. We could proceed axiomatically by
trying to single out intuitive syntactic properties of counts-as statements? Or rather
semantically, by trying to enrich the semantic characterization of classificatory counts-
as exposed in the previous sections in order to capture further semantic nuances? While
formal approaches to counts-as ( [17–19]) have been, up to now, characterized by an
axiomatic perspective, we have instead chosen for a semantics-driven solution. This
choice has been inspired by considering the methodological standpoint of fundamental
work in philosophical logic such as [8, 20].
The same issue we are facing here in analyzing counts-as lies also at the ground of
the Tarskian characterization of the notion of truth and consists in the polysemy of the
to-be-analyzed term. Because of the inherent polysemy of the predicate “to be true”,
Tarski found it unconvincing to proceed introducing the predicate as a primitive and
then axiomatizing it:
“[. . . ] the choice of axioms always has rather accidental character, depending
on inessential factors (such as e.g. the actual state of our knowledge). [. . . ] a
method of constructing a theory does not seem to be very natural [. . . ] if in
this method the role of primitive concepts —thus of concepts whose mean-
ing should appear evident— is played by concepts which have led to various
misunderstanding in the past” ( [20], pag. 405-406).
Instead, he preferred to first isolate a precise sense of the predicate, i.e., truth as corre-
spondence to reality, and then to define it in terms of a better understood notion, i.e.,
the notion of satisfaction of a formula by a model. An axiomatic analysis of counts-as
statements runs the danger alluded to in the quote: since it is not clear what counts-as
statements actually mean, an axiomatization of them could result in mixing under the
the same logical representation different semantic flavors that, from an analytical point
of view, should be kept separated. A systematic discussion of this issue, specifically in
relation with the proposal advanced in [17], can be found in [7].
The work presented in this paper is the result of the application of this method
to the notion of counts-as: in Section 2 we first disentangled different meanings of
the term “counts-as” providing a first map of its polysemy; in Section 3 we formally
analyzed the first and more basic of these meanings explaining it in terms of a better-
understood notion (strict implication within a context); in this section we have pointed
at a first semantic characterization of the other two meanings and in the coming next two
sections we will explain them by making use of better-understood modal logic notions:
the negation of global statements (proper classificatory counts-as) and the definition of
a context (constitutive counts-as).
5 Modal Logic of Counts-as as Proper Contextual Classification
In the following section a modal logic is developed which implements the definition
stated in Formula 10 above. By doing this we will capture the intuitions discussed in
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Section 2 concerning the intuitive reading of counts-as statements in proper classifica-
tory terms. At the same time we will maintain the possible worlds semantics of context
exposed in Section 3 and developed in order to account for the purely classificatory
view of counts-as.
5.1 Expansion of Ln and semantics
Language Ln is expanded as follows. The set of context indexes C is such that it always
contains the special context index u denoting the universal (or global) context. We call
this language Lun.
Languages Lun are given a semantics via a special class of CXT frames, namely
the class of CXT frames F = 〈W, {Wi}i∈C〉 such that W ∈ {Wi}i∈C . That is, the
frames in this class, which we call CXT>, always contain the global context among
their contexts. The definition of the satisfaction relation for language Lun follows.
Definition 5. (Satisfaction based on CXT> frames)
Let M be a model built on a CXT> frame.
M, w |= [u]φ iff ∀ w′ ∈W :M, w′ |= φ
M, w |= [c]φ iff ∀ w′ ∈Wc :M, w′ |= φ
where u is the universal context index and c ranges on the context indexes in C. The
obvious boolean clauses and the clauses for the dual modal operators are omitted.
The new clause states that the [u] operator is interpreted on the universal 1-frame con-
tained in each CXT> frame. It is therefore nothing but a S5 necessity operator.
5.2 Axiomatics
We call Cxtu the logic characterizing the class of CXT> frames. Logic Cxtu results
from the union K45ijn ∪ S5u ∪ {⊆ .ui)}, that is, from the union of K45ijn with the
S5u logic for the [u] operator together with the interaction axiom ⊆ .ui below. The
axiomatics runs thus as follows:
(P) all tautologies of propositional calculus
(Ki) [i](φ1 → φ2)→ ([i]φ1 → [i]φ2)
(4ij) [i]φ→ [j][i]φ
(5ij) ¬[i]φ→ [j]¬[i]φ
(Tu) [u]φ→ φ
(⊆ .ui) [u]φ→ [i]φ
(Dual) 〈i〉φ↔ ¬[i]¬φ
(MP) IF ` φ1 AND ` φ1 → φ2 THEN ` φ2
(Ni) IF ` φ THEN ` [i]φ
where i, j denote elements of the set of indexes C and u denotes the universal context
index in C. The interaction axiom ⊆ .ui states something quite intuitive concerning the
interaction of the [u] operator with all other context operators: what holds in the global
context, holds in every context. Soundness and completeness of this axiomatization
w.r.t. CXT> frames are proven in Section 9.
5.3 Proper classificatory counts-as formalized
Using a multi-modal logicCxtu on a language Lun, the proper classificatory reading of
counts-as statements can be formalized as follows.
Definition 6. (Proper classificatory counts-as: ⇒cl+c )
“γ1 counts as γ2 in context c”, with γ1 and γ2 objective formulae, is formalized in the
logic Cxtu on a multi-modal language Lun as:
γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2 := [c](γ1 → γ2) ∧ ¬[u](γ1 → γ2)
Notice that this definition is nothing but the translation in the Lun language of Formula
10.
What properties of counts-as are lost interpreting it as proper contextual classifica-
tion? And what properties are instead still valid? The following two propositions answer
these questions.
Proposition 2. (Properties of ⇒cl+c : invalidities)
The⇒cl+c versions of reflexivity, strengthening of the antecedent, weakening of the con-
sequent, transitivity and cautious monotonicity are not valid:
γ ⇒cl+c γ (13)
(γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2)→ (γ1 ∧ γ3 ⇒cl+c γ2) (14)
(γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2)→ (γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2 ∨ γ3) (15)
((γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2) ∧ (γ2 ⇒cl+c γ3))→ (γ1 ⇒cl+c γ3) (16)
((γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2) ∧ (γ1 ⇒cl+c γ3))→ ((γ1 ∧ γ2)⇒cl+c γ3) (17)
We do not provide all the proofs, which can be obtained by constructing appropriate
countermodels. We show a countermodel for Formula 16: ∀w ∈W ,M, w |= γ1 → γ3;
∀w ∈ Wc, M, w |= γ1 → γ2 and M, w |= γ2 → γ3; and ∃w′, w′′ s.t. M, w′ |=
γ1 ∧ ¬γ2 ∧ γ3 and M, w′′ |= ¬γ1 ∧ γ2 ∧ ¬γ3.
It might be instructive to provide at this point also an intuitive example for the failure
of transitivity. Before 9/11/2001, it was the case that many legal systems did not specify
a legal notion of terrorism. In the context of the legal systems that did, the following
were therefore proper contextual classifications since they were not holding in general:
“the use or threat of action designed to influence the government and advance a political
cause counts as terrorism” and “terrorism counts as a criminal activity”. However, it
could not be inferred from them that “the use or threat of action designed to influence
the government and advance a political cause counts as a criminal activity” was a proper
contextual classification, because what stated was anyway the case also in those legal
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systems disregarding a notion of terrorism. Intuitively, transitivity fails just because it is
possible to constitute local middle terms, e.g., terrorism, for classifications which hold
globally in the model.
Proposition 3. (Properties of ⇒cl+c : validities)
In logic Cxtu the ⇒cl+c variants of Formulae 1-4 of Proposition 1 are valid:
γ2 ↔ γ3 / (γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2)↔ (γ1 ⇒cl+c γ3) (18)
γ1 ↔ γ3 / (γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2)↔ (γ3 ⇒cl+c γ2) (19)
((γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2) ∧ (γ1 ⇒cl+c γ3))→ (γ1 ⇒cl+c (γ2 ∧ γ3)) (20)
((γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2) ∧ (γ3 ⇒cl+c γ2))→ ((γ1 ∨ γ3)⇒cl+c γ2) (21)
Contextualized antisymmetry, i.e., Formula 7 of Proposition 1 holds in the following
form:
(γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2) ∧ (γ2 ⇒cl+c γ1)→ [c](γ1 ↔ γ2) ∧ ¬[u](γ1 ↔ γ2) (22)
Cumulative transitivity (alias cut) is also valid:
((γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2) ∧ ((γ1 ∧ γ2)⇒cl+c γ3))→ (γ1 ⇒cl+c γ3) (23)
Conditional versions of antecedent strengthening, consequent weakening and transitiv-
ity are valid:
¬[u](γ1 ∧ γ3 → γ2)→ ((γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2)→ (γ1 ∧ γ3 ⇒cl+c γ2)) (24)
¬[u](γ1 → γ2 ∨ γ3)→ ((γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2)→ (γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2 ∨ γ3)) (25)
¬[u](γ1 → γ3)→ ((γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2) ∧ (γ2 ⇒cl+c γ3))→ (γ1 ⇒cl+c γ3) (26)
We provide the deduction of Formula 24 as an example.
1. (P) (γ1 → γ2)→ (γ1 ∧ γ3 → γ2)
2. (N), (K), (MP), 1 [c](γ1 → γ2)→ [c](γ1 ∧ γ3 → γ2)
3. (P) ¬[u](γ1 ∧ γ2 → γ3)
→ (¬[u](γ1 → γ3)→ ¬[u](γ1 ∧ γ2 → γ3))
4. (P), (MP), (Def. 6), 2, 3 ¬[u](γ1 ∧ γ3 → γ2)
→ ((γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2)→ (γ1 ∧ γ3 ⇒cl+c γ2))
Propositions 2 and 3, though very simple, are of key importance for putting our char-
acterization of counts-as as proper contextual classification in perspective with other
proposals. Such a comparison is elaborated in detail in [7].
Formulae 24-26 are also of interest since they show that some quite standard prop-
erties of contextual classifications are inherited by proper contextual classification in
a conditionalized form, the condition being an assertion of invalidity (¬[u]). Proper
classificatory counts-as statements are still monotonic, provided that the strengthened
version of the antecedent does not universally imply the consequent. Similarly they are
still transitive, provided that the implication between γ1 and γ3 is not a validity of the
model. It is worth emphasizing the importance of these results from the perspective of
conceptual analysis and their clarifying power. An alleged intuitive example of tran-
sitivity for counts-as statements, in a proper classificatory sense, is such only if the
appropriate condition is assumed to hold. Consider again the example about terrorism
discussed above. The example could be in fact legitimately be read as an instance of
transitivity once it is also accepted that “the use or threat of action designed to influence
the government and advance a political cause counts as a criminal activity” is not some-
thing which is already globally the case. Similar considerations hold in particular for
the conditionalized version of antecedent strengthening. This property will be further
discussed in Section 7.1.
6 Modal Logic of Constitutive Counts-as
In this section a modal logic is developed which implements Definition 4. Again, the
possible world semantics developed in order to account for the classificatory view of
counts-as lies at the ground of the proposed framework.
6.1 Expanding Lun
Language Lun, which has been used in the previous section to deal with proper con-
textual classification, needs now further expansion to enable the necessary expressivity.
The language is expanded along two lines.
First, the set of context indexes C contains now a set K of m atomic indexes c
among which the universal context index u, and the set of the negations −c of the
atomic contexts, i.e., of the elements of K: C = K ∪ {−c | c ∈ K}. The cardinality n
of C is therefore equal to 2m.
Second, the language needs also to contain a set N of nominals s disjoint from
the set P of propositional atoms. Nominals are names for states in the model or, in
other words, formulae that can be satisfied by only one state in the model. They can be
freely combined with propositions to form well-formed formulae. The BNF is therefore
extended as follows:
φ ::= > | p | s | ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | φ1 ∨ φ2 | φ1 → φ2 | [i]φ | 〈i〉φ.
Metavariables for nominals are written as ν1, ν2, . . .. Modal languages containing nom-
inals have been recently object of thorough study and are known as hybrid languages
( [21]). The language obtained is called Lu,−n .
Nominals are needed in order to provide a sound and complete axiomatization of
the logic based on the semantics presupposed by Definition 4. To be more precise,
they are necessary in order to axiomatize the notion of complement of a context3. This
will become evident by exposing the axiomatics (Section 6.3) and especially, from a
technical point of view, in proving its completeness (Section 9).
3 For this purpose nominals were first introduced by the so-called “Sofia school” of modal logic
( [22,23]) in order to axiomatize the complement and the intersection of accessibility relations,
especially in a dynamic logic setting. In fact, the axiomatics we present in Section 6.3 is strictly
related with the systems studied in their works.
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6.2 Semantics
Languages Lu,−n are given a semantics via a special class of CXT frames, namely
the class of CXT frames F = 〈W, {Wi}i∈C〉 such that there always exists a Wu ∈
{Wi}i∈C s.t.Wu =W ; and such that for any atomic index c ∈ K Wu\Wc ∈ {Wi}i∈C .
That is, the frames in this class, which we call CXT>,\, always contain the global con-
text among their contexts and the complement of every atomic context.
The semantics for Lu,−n is thus obtained interpreting the formulae on models built
on CXT>,\ frames. However, because of the introduction of nominals, the evaluation
function I should be redefined as a function I : P ∪ N −→ P(W ) satisfying the
following constraints:
– For all nominals s ∈ N, I(s) is a singleton set, that is, nominals always denote one
and only one state in the model.
– For all states w ∈ W , there exists a nominal s ∈ N such that I(s) = w, that is,
each state has a name. In other words, the restriction of the interpretation function
I on the set of nominals (NeI) is a surjection on the set of all singletons of W .
The definition of the satisfaction relation for language Lu,−n runs as follows.
Definition 7. (Satisfaction based on CXT>,\ frames)
Let M be a model built on a CXT>,\ frame.
M, w |= s iff I(s) = {w}
M, w |= [u]φ iff ∀ w′ ∈Wu :M, w′ |= φ
M, w |= [c]φ iff ∀ w′ ∈Wc :M, w′ |= φ
M, w |= [−c]φ iff ∀ w′ ∈W\Wc :M, w′ |= φ.
where u is the universal context index and c ranges on the context indexes in C, and s is
a nominal. The obvious boolean clauses and the clauses for the dual modal operators
are omitted.
The first clause states the satisfaction relation for nominals: a nominal s is true in a
state w in model M iff the evaluation function associates w to s. Nominals are there-
fore objective formulae which are true in at most one world. The second clause, which
was already introduced in Definition 5, states that the [u] operator is interpreted on the
universal frame contained in each CXT>,\ frame. The third one is just the standard
clause for contextual truth introduced in Definition 1. Finally, the last and new clause
states that the [−c] operators range over the complements of the sets Wc on which [c]
operators range instead.
Some observations are in order. First of all, let us comment upon the semantics of
the [−c]-operators. In fact, the [c] operator specifies a lower bound on what holds in
context c (‘something more may hold in c’), that is, a formula [c]φ means that φ at
least holds in context c. The [−c] operator, instead, specifies an upper bound on what
holds in c (‘nothing more holds in c’), and a [−c]¬φ formula means therefore that φ at
most holds in c, i.e., ¬φ at least holds in the complement of c. It becomes thus possible
in CXT>,\ frames to express context definitions by means of modal Lu,−n formulae
interpreted on CXT>,\ models. A set of objective formulae Γ defines context c in a
CXT>,\ model M iff:
M |= [c]Γ ∧ [−c]¬Γ (27)
where ¬Γ has to be intended in the obvious sense of the disjunction of the negations of
all formulae in Γ . Formula 27 is an object language modal translation of the property
stated in Formula 11.
Proposition 4. (Equivalence of Formulae 11 and 27)
LetM be a CXT model andM′ be a CXT>,\ such that:M′ is based on a frame having
the same domain of the frame on which M is based, and containing all its contexts;
M′ has the same evaluation function of M. It is the case that, given a set of objective
formulae Γ and a context Wc ∈ {Wi}i∈C:
M, w |= Γ iff w ∈Wc is equivalent to M′ |= [c]Γ ∧ [−c]¬Γ.
Proof. The proof is based on the semantics provided in Definition 7. By construction
of M′, the clause “if w ∈ Wc then M, w |= Γ ” is equivalent to “if w ∈ Wc then
M′, w |= Γ ”, and therefore equivalent to M′ |= [c]Γ . Analogously, the clause “if
w 6∈ Wc then M, w 6|= Γ ” is equivalent to “if w ∈ W\Wc then M′, w |= ¬Γ ”, and
therefore equivalent to M′ |= [−c]¬Γ .
It might be instructive to notice that in practice we are making use, in a different setting
but with exactly analogous purposes, of a well-known technique developed in the modal
logic of knowledge, i.e., the interpretation of modal operators on “inaccessible states”
typical, for instance, of the “all that I know” epistemic logics ( [24]). In our case, the
set of inaccessible states is nothing but the complement of a context.
6.3 Axiomatics
To axiomatize the above semantics an extension of logic K45ijn is needed which can
characterize nominals as names for modal states and, consequently, context comple-
mentation. The extension, which we call logicCxtu,−, results from the unionK45ijn ∪
S5u, that is, from the union of K45ijn with the S5u logic for the [u] operator together
with a group of two axioms (Least and Most) and one rule (Name) which axiomatize
nominals, and a group of two axioms (Covering and Packing) which axiomatize
context complementation. The axiomatics runs as follows:
(P) all tautologies of propositional calculus
(Ki) [i](φ1 → φ2)→ ([i]φ1 → [i]φ2)
(4ij) [i]φ→ [j][i]φ
(5ij) ¬[i]φ→ [j]¬[i]φ
(Tu) [u]φ→ φ
(⊆ .ui) [u]φ→ [i]φ
(Least) 〈u〉 ν
(Most) 〈u〉 (ν ∧ φ)→ [u](ν → φ)
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(Covering) [c]φ ∧ [−c]φ→ [u]φ
(Packing) 〈−c〉 ν → ¬〈c〉 ν
(Dual) 〈i〉φ↔ ¬[i]¬φ
(Name) IF ` ν → θ THEN ` θ
(MP) IF ` φ1 AND ` φ1 → φ2 THEN ` φ2
(Ni) IF ` φ THEN ` [i]φ
where i, j are metavariables for the elements of K, c denotes elements of the set of
atomic context indexes C, u is the universal context index, ν ranges over nominals, and
θ in rule Name denotes a formula in which the nominal denoted by ν does not occur.
The proofs of soundness and completeness of the axiomatization w.r.t. CXT>,\ frames
are provided in Section 9.
The new axioms and rules deserve some comments. Let us start with the axiomati-
zation of nominals. Axiom Least states just that every nominal denotes at least one
state. Vice versa, axiom Most states that nominals denote at most one state. Intuitively
it says that, if there is a state named ν where φ holds, then φ holds if ν is the case. Fi-
nally, rule Name, which we borrowed from standard hybrid logic ( [21]), states that all
states are nominated. It does that by saying that if it is provable that a formula θ holds at
an arbitrary state ν —the state is arbitrary since the rule requires ν not to occur in θ—
then θ itself is provable since there is no world that falsifies it. From a technical point
of view, as observed in [23], this rules states a sufficient condition for function NeI) to
be a surjection on the set of all singletons of W 4. To sum up, axioms Least and Most
with rule Name axiomatize the conditions holding on the interpretation function I as
exposed in Section 6.2.
Let us now discuss the axioms that are more central to the modeling aim we are
pursuing: axioms Covering and Packing. They characterize context complementa-
tion. Axiom Covering states that if some formula holds in both c and−c, than it holds
globally. In other words, it states that the universal context is covered by the contexts
denoted by c and, respectively, −c. Axiom Packing states instead that the contexts
denoted by c and−c are strongly disjoint, in the sense that they do not contain the same
states or. They pack the universal context in two disjoint subcontexts. They are thus just
modal formulations of the two properties characterizing the bipartition of a given set.
Notice that nominals are necessary in the formulation of the Packing axiom. It is easy
to see that, without the possibility of naming individual states, it would be impossible
to axiomatize disjointness.
6.4 A remark: Cxtu,− as hybrid logic
Before putting the formalism at work it might be instructive to make one last technical
remark. In logic Cxtu,− a family of @ν operators is definable, by means of which it is
possible to express that a formula φ holds in the state named by ν: @νφ. This operator
4 Rule Name plays a central role in the completeness proof for CXT>,\ (see the proof of Lemma
9 in Section 9).
is known in hybrid logics ( [21]) as the satisfaction operator. Its semantics is given in
terms of the following satisfaction clause:
M, w |= @νφ iff M, I(ν) |= φ.
The property of “holding in a state” is thus a global property, that is, it is independent
of the point of evaluation. The clause states more precisely that, whatever the state of
evaluation is, it is the case that if ν holds then φ also holds. In fact, the satisfaction
operator can be defined in any logic enabling nominals and a universal modality ( [25],
[26]) as follows:
@νφ := [u](ν → φ) (28)
where @ν is a nominal and φ a formula. Leaving technicalities aside, this means that
logicCxtu,− has sufficient expressive means to represent statements of the type “in sit-
uation (or state) ν state-of-affairs φ holds”. This expressive capability of logic Cxtu,−
will turn out useful to represent intuitive reasoning patterns involving constitutive counts-
as statements (see Proposition 6).
6.5 Constitutive Counts-as formalized
Using a multi-modal logic Cxtu,− on a language Lu,−n , the constitutive reading of
counts-as statements can now be formalized.
Definition 8. (Constitutive counts-as: ⇒coc,Γ )
Given a set of formulae Γ such that γ1 → γ2 ∈ Γ , the constitutive counts-as statement
“γ1 counts as γ2 in the context c defined by Γ” is formalized in a multi-modal logic
Cxtu,\ on language Lu,−n as follows:
γ1 ⇒coc,Γ γ2 := [c]Γ ∧ [−c]¬Γ ∧ ¬[u](γ1 → γ2)
with γ1 and γ2 objective formulae.
The definition implements in modal logic the intuition summarized in Observation 2,
and formalized in Definition 4: constitutive counts-as statements correspond to those
non trivial classifications which are stated by the definition Γ of the context c. In fact
the following can be proven.
Proposition 5. (Equivalence of Definitions 8 and 4)
Let M be a CXT>,\ frame and Γ a set of objective formulae. It is the case that: γ1 →
γ2 ∈ CO(Γ,Wc) iff γ1 → γ2 ∈ {γ1 → γ2 ∈ Γ | M |= γ1 ⇒coc,Γ γ2 }. To put it
otherwise:
CO(Γ,Wc) = {γ1 → γ2 ∈ Γ | M |= γ1 ⇒coc,Γ γ2}
Proof. The proof follows from Proposition 4.
A detailed comment of Definition 8 is in order. The most important consequence of
it is that it is possible to talk about constitutive counts-as only once a set Γ is given. As
already stressed in Section 4.2, there is no formula that is constitutive in isolation. This
logic of constitutive rules takes therefore the warning raised in [27] very seriously: “no
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logic of norms without attention to a system of which they form part” ( [27], pag. 29).
As a result, constitutive counts-as statements can also be viewed as forms of speech
acts creating a context: given that γ1 → γ2 is a formula of Γ , γ1 ⇒coc,Γ γ2 could be
read as “let it be that γ1 → γ2 with all the statements of Γ and only of Γ or, using
the terminology of [28], “fiat Γ and only Γ ”. On the other hand, a constitutive counts-
as is false if either Γ does not define the context denoted by c, or if it expresses a
classification which is valid in the model.
This is precisely the distinctive feature of constitutive counts-as with respect to its
two classificatory relatives. While the classificatory versions of counts-as express what
at least holds in a context (contextual classification) and, respectively, what at least hold
in a context which is not globally true (proper contextual classification), the constitutive
version expresses also what at most holds in a context, thereby making explicit what
the context actually is in terms of a set of formulae of the language. We can have a
constitutive counts-as statement only if it is known what the definition is of the context
the statement refers to. In the classificatory versions of counts-as this knowledge is
absent since it is only partially known what the context explicitly is. Classificatory
and proper classificatory counts-as statements presuppose the existence of a context of
which only some information is available. This issue is discussed in more detail in [7]
where classificatory and proper classificatory counts-as statements are related with the
notion of enthymeme, i.e., of argument with unstated premises.
From a technical point of view, this linguistic dependence amounts to the fact that
expressions of the form γ1 ⇒coc,Γ γ2 where γ1 → γ2 6∈ Γ are just undefined. Only
the classifications that belong to Γ can be evaluated as constitutive counts-as. In other
words ⇒coc,Γ conditionals are not “logical” in the sense of yielding a truth value for
any pair of formulae (γ1, γ2). Because of this there is no logic, in a proper sense, of
constitutive statements pertaining to one context description. Given a set of ⇒coc,Γ state-
ments, nothing can be inferred about ⇒coc,Γ statements which are not already contained
in the set Γ . It is therefore not possible to study ⇒coc,Γ conditionals from a structural
perspective like it has been done for the other forms of counts-as in Propositions 1, 2
and 3.
How awkward this might sound it is perfectly aligned with the intuitions on the
notion of constitution which backed Definition 8: constitutive counts-as are those clas-
sifications which are explicitly stated in the specification of the normative system. In
a sense, constitutive statements are just given, and that is it. This does not mean, how-
ever, that constitutive statements cannot be used to perform reasoning. The following
example depicts the most typical form of reasoning involving constitutive counts-as
statements.
Proposition 6. (⇒coc,Γ and @ν)
The following formula is valid in CXT>,\ frames for any Γ containing γ1 → γ2:
γ1 ⇒coc,Γ γ2 → ((@νΓ ∧@νγ1)→ @νγ2) (29)
Proof. Follows from Definition 4, Formula 28 and propositional logic.
This property shows how constitutive rules work in providing grounds for inferring
the occurrence of new states-of-affairs: it is a rule of the normative system of Utrecht
University that if the promotor pronounces the PhD. student to be a doctor then this
counts as the PhD. student to be a doctor (γ1 ⇒coc,Γ γ2); the current situation ν falls
under the rules of Utrecht University (@νΓ ) and in the current situation the promotor
pronounces a PhD. student to be a doctor (@νγ1), hence in the current situation the
PhD. student is a doctor (@νγ2). Formula 29 perfectly captures the logical pattern of
“conventional generation” as it is described in [29]:
“Act-token A of agent G conventionally generates act-token B [. . . ] only if the
performance of A [. . . ], together with a rule R saying that A [. . . ] counts as B,
guarantees the performance of B” ( [29], p. 25).
It is instructive to notice that, besides formula γ1 ⇒coc,Γ γ2, what plays an essential
role here is formula @νΓ (i.e., [u](ν → Γ )), which states that situation ν is one of the
situations in context c. Without the notion of context definition and the availability of
nominals, this could not be expressed.
Complex reasoning patterns involving constitutive counts-as statements arise also
in relation with the other two notions of counts-as. The following section investigates
the logical relationships between the three different senses of counts-as.
7 Relating the many faces of counts-as
This section is devoted to pursuing the last goal mentioned in the quote from [8] men-
tioned in Section 1: “and then we may proceed to a quiet and systematic study of all
concepts involved, which will exhibit their main properties and mutual relations.”
The logical relations between ⇒coc,Γ , ⇒cl+c and ⇒clc can be studied in logic Cxtu,\
which extends both K45ijn , i.e., the logic in which ⇒clc has been defined, and Cxtu,
i.e., the logic in which ⇒cl+c has instead been defined.
Proposition 7. (⇒clc vs ⇒cl+c vs ⇒coc,Γ )
In logic Cxtu,\ the following formulae are valid:
(γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2)→ (γ1 ⇒clc γ2) (30)
(γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2)→ (γ1 ∧ γ3 ⇒clc γ2) (31)
((γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2) ∧ (γ2 ⇒cl+c γ3))→ (γ1 ⇒clc γ3) (32)
(γ1 ⇒coc,Γ γ2)→ (γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2) (33)
provided that γ1 → γ2 ∈ Γ .
Proofs are omitted and can be easily obtained by application of Definitions 2 and 6 and
Proposition 1.
Let us have a look at the intuitive meaning of the formulae just proven. Formula
30 states something very simple: proper contextual classification implies contextual
classification. This corresponds, in the model-theoretic notation used in Section 4, to
the following inclusion relation: CL+(Wc) ⊆ CL(Wc).
Formulae 31 and 32 are particularly interesting. If we forget that the two operators
⇒cl+c and ⇒clc denote two different notions and we read both expressions γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2
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and γ1 ⇒clc γ2 just as “γ1 counts as γ2”, these formulae would sound as statements
of the property of antecedent strengthening and of the transitivity of “counts-as”. How-
ever, our formal analysis based on the acknowledgment that counts-as hides different
senses has shown that transitivity and antecedent strengthening hold for ⇒clc but not
for ⇒cl+c . On the other hand, and this is what Proposition 7 shows, their logical inter-
actions display patterns clearly reminiscent of those properties. In a sense, we showed
that questions such as “is transitivity a meaningful property for a characterization of
counts-as?” are flawed by the possibility of confusing under the label counts-as differ-
ent notions which enjoy different logical behaviors. This is a concrete example of the
methodological concerns raised in Section 4.3.
More specifically, Formula 31 expresses that given a counts-as statement inter-
preted as a proper classification, a contextual classification can be inferred having as
antecedent a strengthened version of the antecedent of the first statement, and this
although proper contextual classification does not enjoy antecedent strengthening. In
other words, although ⇒cl+c does not enjoy antecedent strengthening, it is nonetheless
grounds for performing monotonic reasoning via ⇒clc . Analogous considerations apply
to Formula 32. Proper contextual classification does not enjoy transitivity but reasoning
via transitivity remains valid shifting from ⇒cl+c to ⇒clc .
Finally, Formula 33 translates the following intuitive fact: the promulgation of a
constitutive rule guarantees the possibility of applying specific classificatory rules. If it
is a rule of Γ that self-propelled conveyances count as vehicles (constitutive sense) then
self-propelled conveyances count as vehicles in the context c defined by Γ in a proper
classificatory sense.
With respect to the relation between constitution and classification, another inter-
esting consequence of Definition 6 is the following one.
Proposition 8. (Impossibility of ⇒cl+u and ⇒cou,Γ )
Proper classificatory counts-as statements and constitutive counts-as statements are
impossible with respect to the universal context u. In fact, the following formulae are
valid:
(γ1 ⇒cl+u γ2)→ ⊥ (34)
(γ1 ⇒cou,Γ γ2)→ ⊥ (35)
provided that γ1 → γ2 ∈ Γ .
The proof is easily obtained from Definition 6.
Intuitively, Formula 34 states that what holds in general can not be the product of
constitution, it can not be a “new” classification. This is indeed a very intuitive property:
the fact that apples are classified as fruit cannot be a proper classification because it is
something that always holds. Formula 35 states something slightly different: if some-
thing holds globally then it can not be used to constitute a context. Universal truths hold
in all contexts, and therefore, can not be specific of any context. To put it otherwise, the
statement “apple count as fruits” can not be a constitutive rule. Notice that contextual
classificatory statements are instead perfectly sound also with respect to the universal
context. Formula γ1 ⇒clu γ2 is a satisfiable formula in logic Cxtu,\.
Let us now take into consideration properties displaying more complex reasoning
patterns.
Proposition 9. (From ⇒coc,Γ to ⇒clc and ⇒cl+c via ⇒clu )
The following formulae are valid:
(γ2 ⇒coc,Γ γ3)→ ((γ1 ⇒clu γ2)→ (γ1 ⇒clc γ3)) (36)
(γ2 ⇒coc,Γ γ3)→ (((γ1 ⇒clu γ2) ∧ ¬[u](γ1 → γ3))→ (γ1 ⇒cl+c γ3)) (37)
provided that γ1 → γ2 ∈ Γ .
The proof is straightforward by application of Definitions 2 and 8, and Propositions 3
and 1. These properties represent typical forms of reasoning patterns involving consti-
tutive rules.
Formula 36: if it is a rule of Γ that γ2 → γ3 (“self-propelled conveyances count
as vehicles”) and it is always the case that γ1 → γ2 (“cars count as self-propelled
conveyances”), then γ1 → γ3 (“cars count as vehicles”) holds in the context c defined
by normative system Γ . Formula 37: if it is a rule of Γ that γ2 → γ3 (“conveyances
transporting people or goods count as vehicles”) and it is always the case that γ1 →
γ2 (“bikes count as conveyances transporting people or goods”) but it is not always
the case that γ1 → γ3 (“bikes count as vehicles”), then γ1 → γ3 (“bikes count as
vehicles”) holds as a constituted classification in the context c defined by normative
system Γ . Notice that while “cars count as self-propelled conveyances” in Formula 36 is
a classificatory counts-as, since it might still be the case that cars are globally classified
as vehicles, “bikes count as vehicles” in Formula 37 is instead a proper classificatory
counts-as since it is explicitly stated that such classification is not a validity. Formula 37
represents nothing but the form of the reasoning pattern that has been used as starting
point of our analysis (Example 1).
The very remarkable aspect about these properties is that they neatly show how
the three senses of counts-as all play a role in the kind of reasoning we perform with
constitutive rules. In particular, they show that the constitutive sense, though enjoying
extremely poor logical properties, grounds in fact all the rich reasoning patterns proper
of classificatory reasoning.
7.1 The transfer problem in the light of⇒clc ,⇒cl+c and⇒coc,Γ
The ‘transfer problem’ has been introduced in [17] as a landmark for testing the intu-
itive adequacy of formalizations of counts-as. It can be exemplified as follows: suppose
that somebody brings it about —for instance by coercion— that a priest effectuates a
marriage, does this count as the creation of a state of marriage? Does anything imply-
ing that a priest effectuates a marriage count as the creation of a state of marriage? In
other words, is the possibility to create a marriage transferable to anybody who brings
it about that the priest effectuates the ceremony? In our framework, these questions get
a triple formulation, one for each of the different senses of counts-as.
The transfer problem and ⇒clc . In [17], the transfer problem has been used as
grounds for the rejection of the property of antecedent strengthening for counts-as
conditionals. It is beyond doubt that a characterization of counts-as which enjoys the
strengthening of the antecedent also exhibits the transfer problem: if that property holds,
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then the fact that the performance of the ceremony counts as the creation of a state of
marriage implies that also a coerced performance does. As already noticed in [6], con-
textual classification (⇒clc ), which enjoys the strengthening of the antecedent (Proposi-
tion 1), does exhibit the transfer problem: whatever situation in which a priest performs
a marriage ceremony is classified as a situation in which a marriage state comes to be.
And this is precisely what we intuitively expect given the notion of contextual classi-
fication as informally introduced in Section 2. In other words, contextual classification
should exhibit the transfer problem or, to put it another way, it should display a transfer
property: the bringing about of a state of marriage should be transferable to any state in
which a priest performs the ceremony.
The transfer problem and ⇒cl+c . It has been shown that the characterization of
proper contextual classification (⇒cl+c ) does not enjoy the strengthening of the an-
tecedent (Proposition 2). Interestingly enough, it still exhibits the transfer problem, as
shown in Proposition 3 where Formula 24 has been proven valid: ¬[u](γ1 → γ3) →
((γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2) ∧ (γ2 ⇒cl+c γ3))→ (γ1 ⇒cl+c γ3).
Intuitively, this formula expresses what follows. If the fact that a priest effectuates
a marriage (γ1) under coercion of a third party (γ3) is not globally classified as giving
rise to a state of marriage (γ2) —which is the case, given the intuitive reading of the
scenario at issue— then it is safe to say that if the priest’s performance of the marriage
counts as (in a proper classificatory sense) a marriage, then a coerced performance of
the marriage counts also as a marriage.
Notice that this is again something perfectly intuitive given the assumptions about
proper contextual classification exposed in Section 2: if a context c makes a classifica-
tion γ1 → γ2 true, which does not hold in general, then also the strengthened version
of it γ1∧γ3 → γ2 is true in that context. Besides, if the strengthened version is also not
true in general, it then follows that γ1 ∧ γ3 → γ2 is also a novel classification which is
brought about by context c. Exhibiting the transfer problem is also for proper contextual
classification not problematic.
From a technical point of view, Proposition 3 shows that a characterization of
counts-as, which does not enjoy the strengthening of the antecedent, can still exhibit
the transfer problem. This is equivalent to say that a notion of counts-as which gen-
uinely rejects the transfer problem should not only reject antecedent strengthening, but
some yet weaker property.
The transfer problem and⇒coc,Γ . The ‘transfer property’ does not hold, instead, for
the constitutive reading of counts-as statements. In this view, counts-as statements rep-
resent the rules specifying a normative system. So, all that it is explicitly stated by the
‘institution of marriage’ is that if the priest performs the ceremony then the couple is
married, while no rule belongs to that normative system which states that the action of
a third party bringing it about that the priest performs the ceremony also counts as a
marriage. Our formalization fully captures this feature. Let the ‘marriage institution’ c
be sketched by the set of rules Γ = {p → m}, i.e., by the rule “if the priest performs
the ceremony, then the couple is married”. Let then t represent the fact that a third party
brings it about that p. For Definition 8 the counts-as (t∧p)⇒coc,Γ m is just an undefined
expression, because ((t∧p)→ m) 6∈ Γ , that is, because the ‘marriage institution’ does
not state such a classification. This seems to suggest that the transfer problem, rather
than having to do with the structural properties of a logical connective, concerns instead
whether a rule is part of the promulgations of a normative system or not, that is to say,
whether a counts-as statement is a constitutive rule or not.
8 Conclusions
Moving from hints provided by the literature on legal and social theory concerning
constitutive rules, the paper has analyzed counts-as statements as forms of contextual
classifications. This analytical option, which we have studied from a formal semantics
perspective, has delivered three semantically precise senses (Definitions 2, 6 and 8) in
which counts-as statements can be interpreted, which we called classificatory, proper
classificatory and constitutive readings. The three readings have then been formally
analyzed making use of modal logic.
The classificatory reading resulted in a strong logic of counts-as conditionals en-
abling many properties which are typical of reasoning with concept subsumptions such
as, in particular, reflexivity, strengthening of the antecedent and weakening of the con-
sequent (Proposition 1). In fact, the logic obtained is nothing but a modal logic version
of the contextual terminological logic we investigated in [9, 10].
The characterization of proper contextual classification resulted, instead, in a much
weaker logic rejecting reflexivity, transitivity and antecedent strengthening (Proposi-
tion 2), but retaining cumulative transitivity (Proposition 3). Noticeably, this notion
corresponds to the counts-as characterized in [17] once transitivity is substituted with
cumulative transitivity. Finally, the notion of proper contextual classification has of-
fered some new insights on the transfer problem (Section 7.1) showing that it cannot be
genuinely avoided just by means of rejecting the strengthening of the antecedent in a
conditional logic setting. This result motivated the investigation of a yet stronger form
of counts-as which we developed in [30], and which stems nevertheless from the same
analytical option backing the present work.
The formal analysis of constitutive counts-as (Definition 8) has neatly shown, with
formal means, in what sense constitutive rules are never constitutive in isolation, but
only as parts of systems of rules, and how constitutive rules work in providing grounds
for attributing institutional properties to situations (Proposition 6). Constitutive counts-
as has also been shown to imply the two classificatory readings (Proposition 7). Other
logical interrelationships between the three notions of counts-as have also been stud-
ied (Propositions 8 and 9) showing also that the logical relations between them could
actually be grounds for fallacies in the formal characterization of counts-as once the
polysemy of the term “counts-as” is overlooked.
9 Appendix: Soundness and Completeness Results
The appendix provides soundness and completeness results for the logics introduced in
the paper: K45ijn , Cxtu and Cxtu,−. Completeness will be proven via the canonical
model technique.
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9.1 Preliminaries
In all the logics considered the axiomatization of every modality [i] contains all tau-
tologies of propositional calculus, axiom K and is closed under rules MP and N. We will
therefore make use of some general results of completeness theory for normal modal
logics. We refer the reader to [21] for further details.
Recall first some facts about maximal consistent sets. Let Λ be a multi-modal nor-
mal logic. A maximal Λ-consistent set of formulae on a multi-modal language Ln is a
set Φ s.t.: (a) ⊥ is not derivable in Λ from Φ (i.e., Λ-consistency of Φ); (b) every set
properly including Φ is Λ-inconsistent. Every maximal Λ-consistent set Φ is such that:
Λ ⊆ Φ; Φ is closed under rule MP; for all formulae φ either φ ∈ Φ or ¬φ ∈ Φ; for all
formulae φ, ψ : φ ∨ ψ ∈ Φ iff φ ∈ Φ or ψ ∈ Φ.
We can now report the notion of canonical model for a logic Λ.
Definition 9. (Canonical model for logic Λ)
The canonical model MΛ for a normal modal logic Λ in the multi-modal language Ln
is the structure
〈
WΛ, {RΛi }1≤i≤n, IΛ
〉
where:
1. The set WΛ is the set of all maximal Λ-consistent sets.
2. The anonical relations RΛi ∈ {RΛi }1≤i≤n are defined as follows: for all w,w′ ∈
WΛ, if for all formulae φ, φ ∈ w′ implies 〈i〉φ ∈ w, then wRΛi w′.
3. The canonical interpretation IΛ is defined by IΛ(p) = {w ∈WΛ | p ∈ w}.
We briefly recall three key propositions of (modal) completeness theory. For the
proofs we refer the reader to [21].
Lemma 1. (Strong completeness = satisfiability of all consistent sets)
A normal modal logic Λ is strongly complete w.r.t. a class of frames F iff every Λ-
consistent set of formulae is satisfiable on some F ∈ F, i.e., it has a model M built on
a frame F in class F.
Lemma 2. (Existence Lemma)
For any normal modal logic Λ and any state w ∈ WΛ, it holds that: if 〈i〉φ ∈ w then
there exists a state w′ ∈WΛ such that wRΛi w′ and φ ∈ w′.
Lemma 3. (Truth Lemma)
For any normal modal logic Λ and any formula φ, it holds that: MΛ, w |= φ iff φ ∈ w.
Lemma 4. (Canonical Model Theorem)
Any normal modal logic Λ is strongly complete w.r.t. its canonical model MΛ.
We will also make use of the notion of point-generated subframe. Given a frame
F = 〈W, {Ri}1≤i≤n}〉, a point-generated subframe Fw of a frame F is a structure
〈Ww, {Rwi }1≤i≤n}〉 such that: (a) Ww is the set of states w′ ∈ W such that there
exists, for any Ri, a finite Ri-path from w to w′; (b) Rwi = Ri ∩ (Ww ×Ww), i.e.,
each Rwi is the restriction of Ri on Ww. The following result is of interest.
Lemma 5. (Generated subframes preserve validity)
Let F be a class of frames and g(F) be the class of point-generated subframes of the
frames in F. It holds that, for all formulae φ on language Ln: F |= φ iff g(F) |= φ.
Finally, we need a way to relate context frames (see Section 3.1), that is, structures
of the type 〈W, {Wi}i∈C〉 with relational structures of the type 〈W, {Ri}i∈C〉. The
bridge is offered by locally universal relations. A relation Ri on a set W is locally
universal if:
– For all Ri ∈ {Ri}i∈C and w ∈W , Ri is universal on ri(w);
– For all w,w′ ∈W , ri(w) = ri(w′), where ri is a function associating to each state
w the set of reachable states via relation Ri.
The following representation result holds for this family of relations.
Lemma 6. (Representation of context frames)
A relation Ri on W is locally universal iff there exists a set Wi ⊆ W such that for all
w,w′, wRiw′ iff w′ ∈Wi.
Proof. The right to left direction is straightforward. From left to right: for everyw,w′ ∈
W it holds, by the definition of function r that wRiw′ iff w′ ∈ ri(w). Since Ri is
locally universal, it holds that for every w,w′′ ∈W , ri(w) = ri(w′′). It is now enough
to stipulate Wi = ri(w′′) for any w′′ to obtain the desired result: there exists a set
Wi ⊆W such that for all w,w′, wRiw′ iff w′ ∈Wi.
Leaving technicalities aside, the property of local universality forces relations in {Ri}i∈C
to cluster the domain of the frame in sets of worlds (contexts), one for each accessibil-
ity relation, and then defines these accessibility relations in such a way that the sets of
accessible worlds correspond, for each world in W , to the clusters.
9.2 Soundness and completeness of K45ijn
The proof of soundness is routinary. It is well-known that inference rules MP and N
preserve validity on any class of frames5. Providing the soundness of K45ijn w.r.t. CXT
frames boils than down to checking the validity of axioms 4ij and 5ij .
Theorem 1. (Soundness of K45ijn w.r.t. CXT frames)
Logic K45ijn is sound w.r.t. the class of CXT frames.
Proof. The validity of 4ij is proven showing that its contrapositive has no counter-
model. Such countermodel M would contain a state w such that for a given formula
φ, M, w |= 〈j〉 〈i〉φ and M, w |= ¬ 〈i〉φ. Hence, by the semantics, ∃w′ ∈ Wi
s.t. M, w |= φ and @w′ ∈ Wi s.t. M, w |= φ, which is impossible. The validity
of 5ij is proven in the same way. Suppose there is a model M and a state w such
that M, w |= 〈i〉φ and M, w |= ¬[j] 〈i〉φ. Hence, by the semantics, ∃w′ ∈ Wi s.t.
M, w |= φ and @w′ ∈Wi s.t. M, w |= φ.
The proof of completeness is obtained in two steps.
1. First, via the canonical model, it is proven that logicK45ijn is complete with respect
to the class of i-j transitive (if wRiw′ and w′Rjw′′ then wRjw′′), and i-j euclidean
(if wRiw′ and wRjw′′ then w′Rjw′′) frames6.
5 See [21].
6 In [31], frames with this property are called, respectively, hyper-transitive and hyper-euclidean.
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2. Second, it is proven that if F is the class of of i-j transitive and i-j euclidean frames,
for every φ ∈ Ln: F |= φ iff CXT |= φ.
Theorem 2. (Completeness of K45ijn)
Logic K45ijn is strongly complete w.r.t. the class of i-j transitive and i-j euclidean
frames.
Proof. By Lemma 1, given a K45ijn-consistent set Φ of formulae, it suffices to find a
model state pair (M, w) such that: (a) M, w |= Φ, and (b) the frame F on which M is
based is i-j transitive and i-j euclidean. LetMK45ijn =
〈
WK45
ij
n , {RK45ijni }i∈C , IK45
ij
n
〉
be the canonical model of logic K45ijn , and let Φ+ be any maximal consistent set in
WK45
ij
n extending Φ. By Lemma 3 it follows that MK45ijn , Φ+ |= Φ, which proves
(a). It remains to be proven that
〈
WK45
ij
n , {RK45ijni }i∈C
〉
enjoys i-j transitivity (b.1)
and i-j euclidicity (b.2). To prove (b.1) consider three states w,w′, w′′ ∈ WK45ijn such
that wRK45
ij
n
j w
′ and w′RK45
ij
n
i w
′′
. Suppose then that φ ∈ w′′. As w′RK45ijni w′′ and
wR
K45ijn
j w
′
, it follows that 〈i〉φ ∈ w′ and then that 〈j〉 〈i〉φ ∈ w. Now, w is a maximal
consistent set of logic K45ijn , it therefore contains formula 〈j〉 〈i〉φ → 〈i〉φ (i.e., the
contrapositive of axiom 4ij), hence 〈i〉φ ∈ w and thus wRK45ijni w′′ which completes
the proof of (b.1). Analogously, to prove (b.2) consider three statesw,w′, w′′ ∈WK45ijn
such that wRK45
ij
n
j w
′ and wRK45
ij
n
i w
′′
. Suppose then that φ ∈ w′′. It follows that
〈i〉φ ∈ w and since w is a maximal consistent set of logic K45ijn , it therefore con-
tains formula 〈i〉φ → [j] 〈i〉φ (i.e., axiom 5ij) and hence [j] 〈i〉φ ∈ w. From this
and from wRK45
ij
n
i w
′′ it follows that 〈i〉φ ∈ w′′, that is to say, for any formula φ it
is the case that: if φ ∈ w′ then 〈i〉φ ∈ w′′. Now, by Definition 9, this implies that
w′RK45
ij
n
i w
′′ which proves (b.2).
Lemma 7. (Semantic equivalence for CXT frames)
Consider the class F of i-j transitive and i-j euclidean frames. For every φ ∈ Ln, F |= φ
iff CXT |= φ. That is, CXT frames and F frames define the same logic.
Proof. From right to left: for every φ, CXT |= φ implies F |= φ. The proof is obtained
showing that if F is a CXT frame then it is i-j transitive and i-j euclidean. By Lemma
6, for all w,w′ ∈W , w′ ∈Wi iff wRiw′. To prove i-j transitivity, suppose that wRiw′
(w′ ∈ Wi) and w′Rjw′′ (w′′ ∈ Wj). It follows therefore that wRjw′′. The proof
of i-j euclidicity is perfectly analogous. Suppose that wRiw′ (w′ ∈ Wi) and wRjw′′
(w′′ ∈ Wj), hence w′Rjw′′. From left to right: for every φ, F |= φ implies CXT |= φ.
In this case, the proof is obtained by showing that every i-j transitive and i-j euclidean
frame, which is also point-generated, is a context frame. By Lemma 5, it holds that for
every φ, F |= φ iff g(F) |= φ. Now, letFw be any frame in g(F) generated by some state
w. In order to prove the desired result, it suffices to show that every i-j transitive and i-j
euclidean frame Fw generated by state w is a CXT frame. By Lemma 6, this is proven
by showing that for every Rwi ∈ {Rwi }i∈C , w′Rwi w′′ iff w′′ ∈ rwi (w). This amounts to
prove that for every w′, w′′ if there exists an Ri-path from w to w′ and from w to w′′,
then w′Riw′′ iff w′′ ∈ ri(w). From left to right, if there exists an Ri-path from w to
w′ and w′Riw′′, then by transitivity (which is a special case of i-j transitivity) wRiw′′,
that is, w′′ ∈ ri(w). From right to left, if there exists an Ri-path from w to w′ and
w′′ ∈ ri(w), then wRiw′′ and hence, by euclidicity, w′Riw′′.
Corollary 1. (Completeness of K45ijn w.r.t. CXT frames)
Logic K45ijn is strongly complete w.r.t. the class of CXT frames.
Proof. Follows directly from Theorem 2 and Lemma 7.
9.3 Soundness and completeness of Cxtu
On the grounds of the results of the previous section, the proof of soundness and com-
pleteness of Cxtu w.r.t. CXT> can be easily obtained. Soundness boils down to prove
that axioms Tu and ⊆ .ui are valid in Cxtu frames.
Theorem 3. (Soundness of Cxtu w.r.t.CXT> frames)
Logic Cxtu is sound w.r.t. the class of CXT> frames.
Proof. Trivial, given the interpretation of the [u]-operator as universal quantification on
all the states in the domain W of the frame.
Let TE∼ be the class of frames satisfying the following properties: they are i-j
transitive, i-j euclidean; they contain an equivalence relation Ru such that for all i ∈ C,
Ri ⊆ Ru. Again, completeness w.r.t. the relevant class of frames is proven in two steps.
1. Logic Cxtu is first proven to be complete w.r.t. the class of TE∼ frames.
2. It is then proven that for any formula φ on Ln: TE∼ |= φ iff CXT>|= φ.
Theorem 4. (Completeness of Cxtu)
Logic Cxtu is strongly complete w.r.t. the class TE∼ frames.
Proof. By Lemma 1, given a Cxtu-consistent set Φ of formulae, it suffices to find a
model state pair (M, w) such that: (a) M, w |= Φ, and (b) the frame F on which
M is based is i-j transitive and i-j euclidean and contains a universal relation. Claim
(a) is proven by making use of Lemma 3. It remains to be proven that the frame〈
WCxt
u
, {RCxtui }i∈C
〉
of the canonical model enjoys i-j transitivity and i-j euclidic-
ity (b.1) and that there exists a relation RCxtuu ∈ {RCxt
u
i }i∈C such that RCxt
u
u is an
equivalence relation (b.2) and for every i ∈ C, Ri ⊆ Ru (b.3). Claim (b.1) follows
from Theorem 2 since Cxtu extends K45ijn . As to (b.2), it follows from (b.1) that each
RCxt
u
i is transitive and euclidean and, therefore, so is RCxt
u
u . The proof of the reflex-
ivity of RCxtui is then routinary. Finally, claim (b.3) needs to be proven. Consider two
states w,w′ ∈ WCxtu such that wRCxtui w′. Suppose then that φ ∈ w′. It follows that
〈i〉φ ∈ w. Sincew is a maximalCxtu-consistent set, it contains formula 〈i〉φ→ 〈u〉φ
(i.e., the contrapositive of axiom ⊆ .ui) and therefore 〈u〉φ ∈ w. Hence, by Definition
9, wRCxtuu w′.
Lemma 8. (Semantic equivalence for CXT> frames)
For any formula φ on Ln: TE∼ |= φ iff CXT>|= φ. That is, CXT> frames and TE∼
frames define the same logic.
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Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 7. The direction from right to left
(for every φ, CXT>|= φ implies TE∼ |= φ) is straightforwardly proven by observing
that every CXT> frame represents a frame containing a universal relation Ru. In fact, a
relation Ru is universal iff it holds that: for any w,w′ ∈W , wRuw′ iff w′ ∈W (notice
that this is a special case of Lemma 6). But every universal relation is an equivalence
relation, which also includes all Ri’s for any i ∈ C. That all CXT> frames are i-j
transitive and i-j euclidean follows from Lemma 7. This completes the proof of the
right-to-left direction. From left to right: for every φ, TE∼ |= φ implies CXT>|= φ.
Lemma 7 has proven that every i-j transitive and i-j euclidean frame generated by state
w is a CXT frame. Consider now the relation Rwu of the point-generated subframe Fw
of a frame F ∈ TE∼ containing an equivalence relation Ru such that for all i ∈ C,
Ri ⊆ Ru. To obtain the desired result —via Lemma 5— it suffices to show that the
relation Rwu is universal on Ww, which is trivial.
Corollary 2. (Completeness of Cxtu w.r.t. CXT> frames)
Logic Cxtu is strongly complete w.r.t. the class of CXT> frames.
Proof. Follows directly from Theorem 4 and Lemma 8.
9.4 Soundness and completeness of Cxtu,−
The proof of soundness is routinary.
Theorem 5. (Soundness of Cxtu,− w.r.t. CXT>,\ frames)
Logic Cxtu is sound w.r.t. the class of CXT>,\ frames.
Proof. It is to show that axioms Covering and Packing are valid in CXT>,\ frames
by just noticing that in CXT>,\ frames, for any atomic context index c, family {Wc,W−c}
is a bipartition of the domainW :W ⊆Wc∪W−c, i.e., family {Wc,W−c} is a covering
of W ; and Wc ∩W−c = ∅, i.e., {Wc,W−c} is a packing of W .
Let TE∼,\ be the class of frames satisfying the following properties: they are i-j
transitive, i-j euclidean; they contain an equivalence relation Ru such that for all i ∈ C,
Ri ⊆ Ru; the set of relations {Ri}i∈C is such that, for any atomic context index c
and states w,w′ ∈ W : wRuw′ implies wRcw′ or wR−cw′; and wRcw′ implies not
wR−cw′. Again, completeness w.r.t. the CXT>,\ frames is proven in two steps.
1. Logic Cxtu,− is first proven to be complete w.r.t. the class of TE∼,\ frames.
2. It is then proven that for any formula φ on Ln: TE∼,\ |= φ iff CXT>,\|= φ.
For completeness we need to prove some facts about the canonical model of logic
Cxtu,−. Before stating and proving the desired lemma consider first that, since logic
Cxtu,− extends logic Cxtu, we know by Theorem 4 that the canonical model of
logic Cxtu,− contains an equivalence relation RCxtu,−u such that for every i ∈ C,
RCxt
u,−
i ⊆ RCxt
u,−
u . Recall also that every equivalence relation yields a partition on
its domain. The cluster of the partition yielded by RCxtu,−u on WCxt
u,−
containing
state w is denoted by rCxtu,−u (s), that is, the set of states reachable by w via RCxt
u,−
u .
Lemma 9. (Properties of maximal Cxtu,−-consistent sets)
LetMCxtu,− =
〈
WCxt
u,−
, {RCxtu,−i }i∈C , ICxt
u,−
〉
be the canonical model of logic
Cxtu,−.
1. All maximal Cxtu,−-consistent sets in WCxtu,− contain at least one nominal;
2. If a nominal is contained in a maximal Cxtu,−-consistent set w ∈ WCxtu,− then
it is not contained in any other maximal Cxtu,−-consistent set w′ ∈ WCxtu,−
which is accessible from w via RCxtu,−u . In other words, if two maximal Cxtu,−-
consistent sets contain the same nominal, and belong to the same cluster of the
partition of WCxtu,− yielded by RCxtu,−u , then they are the same set.
3. Each nominal in N is contained in at least one maximal Cxtu,−-consistent set.
Proof. Clause 1. LetΦ be a maximalCxtu,−-consistent set ofLu,−n formulae. To prove
the first claim, suppose per absurdum that ∀ν ∈ N, ¬ν ∈ Φ. It follows that for every ν
there exists a finite conjunction θ of formulae from Φ such that: ` ν → ¬θ. Now, either
ν occurs in θ and thus ν ∈ Φ, or ν does not occur in θ and therefore, by rule Name,
¬θ ∈ Φ which is impossible. Clause 2 is proven in two steps. (a) Given a nominal
ν ∈ Φ, for any maximal Cxtu,−-consistent set Φ it is proven that for all φ: φ ∈ Φ iff
[u](ν → φ) ∈ Φ. (b) Given two maximalCxtu,−-consistent sets Φ and Φ′, if ν ∈ Φ,Φ′
and ΦRCxtu,−u Φ′ then Φ = Φ′. Let us prove (a). From left to right. We assumed a
nominal ν ∈ Φ, hence if φ ∈ Φ then ν ∧ φ ∈ Φ, being Φ a maximal Cxtu,−-consistent
set. The setΦ also contains formula φ→ 〈u〉φ (i.e., the contrapositive of axiom Tu) and
〈u〉 (ν∧φ)→ [u](ν → φ) (i.e., axiom Most) from which it follows that 〈u〉 (ν∧φ) ∈ Φ
and hence that [u](ν → φ) ∈ Φ. From right to left: for any φ ∈ Φ, if [u](ν → φ) ∈ Φ
then by axiom Tu we obtain ν → φ ∈ Φ and then by MP φ ∈ Φ. Let us prove (b)
per absurdum. Suppose Φ 6= Φ′. Then there should exist a formula φ such that φ ∈ Φ
and φ 6∈ Φ′ and hence ¬φ ∈ Φ′. From (a) it follows that [u](ν → φ) ∈ Φ and since
ΦRCxt
u,−
u Φ
′ we obtain that ν → φ ∈ Φ′ and via MP φ ∈ Φ′, which is impossible.
Clause 3 follows easily from Lemma 2 and the fact that every state w ∈ WCxtu,−
contains formula 〈u〉 ν (axiom Least).
The lemma concerns some key properties of the interpretation of nominals. Clause 1
guarantees that in the canonical model every maximalCxtu,−-consistent set contains a
nominal, that is, that ICxtu,− is a surjection on the set of singletons ofWCxtu,− . Clause
2 is particularly interesting. It states that the same nominal can in fact belong to different
maximal Cxtu,−-consistent sets if these sets are not related via RCxtu,−u . To put it
otherwise, nominals behave as real names only if they refer to sets in a same cluster in
the partition yielded by RCxtu,−u . It follows that interpreting nominals on a generated
subframe guarantees them to behave like names, and this is precisely enough for our
purposes since generated subframes preserve validity (Lemma 5). Finally, Clause 3
states just that all nominals get a denotation.
Theorem 6. (Completeness of Cxtu,−)
Logic Cxtu,− is strongly complete w.r.t. the class of TE∼,\ frames, that is, frames
satisfying the following clauses:
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1. They are i-j transitive, i-j euclidean.
2. They contain an equivalence relation Ru such that for all i ∈ C, Ri ⊆ Ru.
3. The set of relations {Ri}i∈C is such that, for any atomic context index c and states
w,w′ ∈ W : (3.a) wRuw′ implies wRcw′ or wR−cw′; and (3.b) wR−cw′ implies
not wRcw′.
Proof. By Lemma 1, given a Cxtu,−-consistent set Φ of formulae, it suffices to find
a model state pair (M, w) such that: (a) M, w |= Φ, and (b) the frame F on which
M is based satisfies clauses 1-3. Claim (a) is proven by making use of Lemma 3.
It remains to be proven that the frame
〈
WCxt
u,−
, {RCxtu,−i }i∈C
〉
of the canonical
model satisfies clauses 1-3. Clause 1 and Clause 2 are proven to be satisfied by The-
orem 4 since Cxtu,− extends K45ijn and Cxtu. Claims (3.a) and (3.b) of clause 3
remain to be proven. To prove claim (3.a) it has to be shown that: for any atomic
context index c and states w,w′ ∈ WCxtu,− , wRCxtu,−u w′ implies wRCxt
u,−
c w
′ or
wRCxt
u,−
−c w
′
. Consider two states w,w′ ∈ WCxtu,− such that wRCxtu,−u w′ and sup-
pose that φ ∈ w′. Since w is a maximal Cxtu,−-consistent set, it contains formula
〈u〉φ → (〈c〉φ ∨ 〈−c〉φ) (i.e., the contrapositive of axiom Covering) and there-
fore 〈c〉φ ∨ 〈−c〉φ ∈ w. For the properties of maximal consistent sets it follows that
either 〈c〉φ ∈ w or 〈−c〉φ ∈ w, and hence by Definition 9, either wRCxtu,−c w′ or
wRCxt
u,−
−c w
′
, which proves (3.a). As to (3.b), it should be proven that for any atomic
context index c and states w,w′ ∈ WCxtu,− , wRCxtu,−−c w′ implies not wRCxt
u,−
c w
′
.
Suppose that wRCxtu,−−c w′. By Clause 1 in Lemma 9 we know that w′ should contain
at least one nominal. Since all nominals denote at least one state (Clause 3 in Lemma 9)
we can pick a nominal ν and suppose it to be the nominal contained in w′. By Clause
2 of this theorem, from wRCxtu,−−c w′ it follows that wRCxt
u,−
u w
′ and from this, by
Clause 2 in Lemma 9, we know that there is no w′′ ∈ rCxtu,−u (w) such that ν ∈ w′′.
By Definition 9 it follows that 〈−c〉 ν ∈ w. Now, w is a maximal Cxtu,−-consistent
set and it contains thus formula 〈−c〉 ν → ¬〈c〉 ν (i.e., axiom Packing). It follows
that ¬ 〈c〉 ν ∈ w and it is therefore not the case that wRCxtu,−c w′, which proves claim
(3.b).
Lemma 10. (Semantic equivalence for CXT>,\ frames)
For any formula φ on Ln: TE∼,\ |= φ iff CXT>,\|= φ. That is, CXT>,\ frames and
TE∼,\ frames define the same logic.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemmata 7 and 8. From right to left:
for every φ, CXT>,\|= φ implies TE∼,\ |= φ. The results follow by the application of
Proposition 6. From W =Wc ∪W−c for any atomic context identifier c, it follows that
for everyw,w′ ∈W ,wRuw′ implieswRcw′ orwR−cw′. And fromWc∩W−c = ∅ for
any atomic context identifier c, it follows that for every w,w′ ∈ W , wR−cw′ implies
not wRcw′. From left to right: for every φ, TE∼,\ |= φ implies CXT>,\|= φ. It suffices
to show that every point-generated subframe of any TE∼,\ frame is a CXT>,\ frame.
The desired result follows then from Lemma 5. Consider a frame Fw ∈ g(TE∼,\)
generated by state w. We show that Fw is a CXT>,\ frame. Building on the proofs
of Lemma 7 and on the fact that TE∼,\ already contain a universal relation, it just
needs to be shown that for any atomic index c: (a) Ww ⊆ rc(w) ∪ r−c(w) and (b)
rc(w) ∩ r−c(w) ⊆ ∅. Both claims are straightforwardly proven by observing that for
any atomic context index c and states w′, w′′ ∈ Ww: w′Rwuw′′ (i.e., w′′ ∈ Ww )
implies w′Rwc w′′ (i.e., w′′ ∈ rc(w) ) or w′Rw−cw′′ (i.e., w′′ ∈ r−c(w)); and w′Rwc w′′
(i.e., w′′ ∈ rc(w)) implies not w′Rw−cw′′ (i.e., w′′ 6∈ r−c(w)).
Corollary 3. (Completeness of Cxtu,− w.r.t. CXT>,\ frames)
Logic Cxtu,− is strongly complete w.r.t. the class of CXT>,\ frames.
Proof. Follows directly from Theorem 6 and Lemma 10.
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